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  I&S 
MODEL AND IMPLEMENTATION  
OF SAFETY CASE CORES 
Kateryna NETKACHOVA 
Abstract: The paper introduces a general concept of Safety Case Core, which is 
an extension of the Safety Case methodology. The definition of the safety case core 
is provided, the scope, principles and structure of a core are outlined, and a general 
set-theoretical model is presented. An approach to tracking and managing vulner-
ability information, assessing security and reliability characteristics of ready-made 
software components is discussed. To demonstrate the practical relevance and ap-
plicability of the proposed approach, a safety case core for assessing off-the-shelf 
components is developed. The database schema of the developed safety case core, 
modelled using the entity-relationship diagram, is presented; the important design 
and implementation details and techniques are outlined. The integration of the core 
with ASCE software tool as a plug-in and implementation as a web service for off-
the-shelf component assessment are presented. 
Keywords: Safety case core, security, vulnerability, OTS component assessment, 
ASCE plug-in, web service. 
Introduction  
Safety plays a crucial role in the modern society. Assuring safe operation is one of the 
vitally important tasks faced by system developers and experts. The concept of Safety 
Case has been evolving for over 20 years. World famous scientists such as Peter 
Bishop, Tim Kelly, J Górski and others made a great impact on the concept and its 
implementation.
1
 The concept has evolved, grown and nowadays become a common 
and generally accepted practice. However, future research is still needed to develop 
the approach further on and make it even more useful, accurate, efficient, and of 
course, automated. 
In this paper we introduce a concept of Safety Case Core, which can be considered 
one of the Safety Case methods. We also discuss an approach to assessing security 
characteristics of OTS components. In order to help security experts in software as-
sessment, vulnerability tracking and management processes, a special Safety Case 
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core for assessing OTS components was developed and implemented as a plug-in for 
ASCE software tool and as a web service for OTS components assessment. 
The paper is structured in the following way: Section 1 provides a definition of safety 
case core, describes it structure, model and the main concept; Section 2 presents a 
core for assessing OTS components and gives some implementation details; Sections 
3 and 4 describe the implementation of the core as an ASCE plug-in and as a web 
service for assessing OTS components and tracking vulnerabilities. The paper ends 
with concluding remarks, future directions and extensions to this work. 
1. Safety Case Core concept 
Safety Case Core can be defined as a reusable configurable unit that contains a piece 
of safety assessment logic and can perform various tasks to assist in safety case de-
velopment and maintaining processes. The concept of safety case cores can be easily 
understood by viewing the entire system safety assessment process from the stand-
point of independent tasks that need to be performed. Some of these tasks are essen-
tially the same or similar in many systems and it would be sensible not to perform 
those tasks over and over again. Instead, it is better to create separate safety case 
cores for such tasks and transfer safety assessment logic to the level of such cores. 
The next steps would be to automate tasks performed within the cores by writing 
code, and adding a parameterization feature to support various input parameters. The 
parameterization feature is very important as it makes the core much more flexible, 
configurable and easier to reuse in different systems. 
Parameters serve as input for safety case cores. The values of parameters are usually 
retrieved from the system requirement profile, because in most cases parameters rep-
resent the requirements established for a part of the system assessed using a particular 
safety case core.  
A general set-theoretical model of safety case core can be set up as follows: 
SCC = {X, Y, F, D, G, H} 
where X = {x1… xn} is a set of input parameters, which is a subset of all parameters P 
= {p1, …, pc} supported by the Safety Case core, X  P; c – number of supported pa-
rameters; n – number of requirements used as core parameters when assessing a par-
ticular system, n  c; yi = F(xi), i=1...n; Y = <H(F(x1)…F(xn)), G(F(x1)…F(xn))> – the 
output result from the core; F = {f1…fm} – a set of functions, defined within the core; 
}DD,DD{D
p1n1 dfdfsfsff
  - a set of formalized data used by the core, where 
Form = {Form1, … Form t} –is a set of data formats, Мform = {Mform1, … Mformm} – a 
set of data conversion methods, 
kj`k fnfform
DD:M  ; H – function that processes 
and combines the results of F functions execution; G – function that provides a for-
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mal representation of the results using one of the safety case notations. The core 
should pass through all these steps during its execution. The general structure of a 
core is shown on Figure 1. Figure 2 presents the respective data flow diagram for as-
sessment utilising Safety Case Cores. 
2. Safety Case Core for assessing OTS components 
There are a number of channels that provide information about software vulnerabili-
ties and are designed to help identify and solve the known security problems. CVE,
2
 
NVD,
3
 Secunia,
4
 SecurityFocus,
5
 OVAL,
6
 and CERT 
7
 represent just a partial list of 
such information sources. The need to efficiently store, manage and manipulate this 
information is at the heart of the assessment process. Thus selecting, organizing and 
storing vulnerabilities data is one of the first and important steps in the preparation 
for assessment. The structure of the database should be kept simple and understand-
able, but at the same time it should be complex enough to include all the necessary 
characteristics, tables and relations between them. Having analyzed the semantics and 
structure of the most common vulnerability databases and sources, we propose the 
following conceptual database schema modelled using the ER diagram (Figure 3): 
In order to fill this database with data from various vulnerability sources, a parser 
converting the information to the appropriate structure is needed. We propose the 
following basic steps that should be taken to convert the information and load it to the 
database: 
1. Convert the information from the original source format into an object 
model; 
2. Filter the objects created on the previous step to only retrieve vulnerabilities; 
3. Map the obtained object properties onto the object properties of our data-
base object model; 
4. Convert the resulting object model into the relational database model. 
We note that there may be other ways to load the data, for example, by working with 
relational database models. However, using object-oriented models is, in our opinion, 
a better and more practical solution, especially when the structure of a third-party 
database is quite different from our database structure, and we need to retrieve and 
load large amounts of data. 
 
Figure 1: The general structure of safety case core. 
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Figure 2: Data flow diagram of the assessment process using Safety Case Cores. 
After the vulnerabilities data is loaded, it is possible to manipulate it and obtain vari-
ous software reliability characteristics, such as the number of discovered vulnerabili-
ties, their severity rates, failure frequency, evaluate recovery time etc. The assessment  
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Figure 3: Entity-Relationship diagram. 
 
techniques have subject of analysis.
8
 The calculated attribute values are compared 
with software requirements received as input parameters in order to verify whether 
the requirements are met or not. After that, the output information from the core is 
passed onto the next step, folded with other results, if necessary, and used in the sys-
tem safety case development process. 
3. Integration with ASCE tool 
The ASCE tool developed by Adelard 
9
 is the leading commercial system for the 
development and management of assurance cases and safety cases. ASCE is designed 
to help creating and managing safety cases with the use of formal notations such as 
Claims-Arguments-Evidence (CAE) and Goal Structuring Notation (GSN). As part of 
our work, we implemented a Safety Case Core for OTS components assessment as a 
plug-in for ASCE tool and demonstrated its applicability by using it to assess several 
characteristics of OTS components. The main elements of user interface such as the 
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contextual right click menu and the steps of the OTS safety case core wizard are 
shown Figures 4 and 5. The implementation was performed using Ascad notation as a 
basis for representation.
10
 
 
Figure 4: Contextual menu of OTS core integrated into ASCE software tool. 
4. Implementation as a web service 
Based on the same concept, a web service was developed in order to assist in OTS 
component assessment, vulnerability tracking and management processes. The web 
service helps increase the overall reliability of software systems and protect them 
from malicious attacks. It provides information about discovered vulnerabilities and 
patches that are available to fix them, thus assisting in remediation of system compo-
nents and preventing the exploitation of already known vulnerabilities. The service 
also calculates various software security and reliability characteristics, which can help 
client applications that support decision making and reconfiguration activities dy-
namically reconfigure the software based on the obtained results.  
The web service is developed on Microsoft .Net platform using IIS and MS Sql 
server. The interface is described in a machine-processable WSDL format. Client ap-
plications interact with the web service using SOAP messages, transmitted over 
HTTP protocol with POST method. In our scheme Configuration Control Server acts 
as a client. It contains information about all software components used within the 
system as well as the way those components are configured. 
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Figure 5: The interface of the OTS core wizard steps. 
 
The whole process of using the web service can be summarized in the following 
steps: 
1. The Configuration Control Server (CCS) checks the security state of its 
components on a periodic basis by sending POST requests to invoke a web 
service operation. The body of such request is composed of an XML mes-
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sage that contains the list of software products, their vendors, versions and 
languages. 
2. Web service processes the request and connects to the database to retrieve 
the necessary information for each particular software product. Based on the 
retrieved information, open security threats are identified. Then various se-
curity and reliability characteristics such as the number of discovered vul-
nerabilities, their severity rates, failure frequency, recovery time, faultness 
probability etc. are calculated and prediction based on extrapolation of cal-
culated results is carried out.
11
 If available, the links to security patches are 
retrieved. The obtained and calculated information is used for generating a 
SOAP response. 
3. Based on the response from the web service, CCS makes a decision to 
dynamically reconfigure the system, apply patches to vulnerable software 
products or reboot the hosts with alternative non-vulnerable components. 
The Configuration Control Server can also contain logic for comparing characteris-
tics of different software products and choosing an optimal system configuration even 
when there are no open security breaches or when every product of the same type has 
some sort of vulnerabilities in it. The web service architecture is presented on Figure 
6. 
 
Figure 6. Web service architecture. 
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To summarize, the main advantages of the developed web service are as follows:  The web service helps monitoring security channels for vulnerability an-
nouncements and alerts a client to the danger when a new vulnerability is 
discovered.  Calculates various software security and reliability characteristics based on 
the information about previous failures (retrospective analysis). This feature 
is of great help in analyzing products in-service history. It also allows pre-
dicting the potential issues that may occur in the future.  Provides information about security patches. As a rule patches are provided 
by software vendors or third-party developers and located on their official 
websites. Monitoring and applying those patches are tedious and time-con-
suming tasks, which often require manual effort. That’s why it is useful to 
have a single place that contains security patches for all applications. The 
links to security patches are returned within the web service response, which 
allows the client application to configure automatic updates and deploy 
patches without any, or with very little manual manipulations. 
The developed web service is recommended to be used in conjunction with the intru-
sion-tolerant architecture 
12
 or similar architectures for constructing complex software 
based systems. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have outlined the concept of Safety Case Cores and presented a core 
for assessing OTS components. The core was developed using an object-oriented ap-
proach and integrated both as a plug-in for ASCE tool and as a web service for as-
sessing OTS components. The practical applicability of the core was confirmed by 
taking a set of OTS components, evaluating their reliability characteristics and com-
paring them with the required values. For future work, we plan to extend the func-
tionality of our OTS core and deploy our web service as a cloud-based solution. 
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